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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates some of the philosophical and conceptual issues raised by the search for a quan-
tum theory of gravity. It is critically discussed whether such a theory is necessary in the first place, and how 
much would be accomplished if it is eventually constructed. I argue that the motivations behind, and ex-
pectations to, a theory of quantum gravity are entangled with central themes in the philosophy of science, 
in particular unification, reductionism, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. I further argue that 
there are —contrary to claims made on behalf of string theory— no good reasons to think that a quantum 
theory of gravity, if constructed, will provide a theory of everything, that is, a fundamental theory from 
which all physics in principle can be derived.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the outstanding tasks in fundamental physics, according to many theoretical 
physicists, is the construction of a quantum theory of gravity. The so far unsuccessful 
attempt to construct such a theory is an attempt to unify Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity with quantum theory (or quantum field theory).  While quantum gravity aims 
to describe everything in the universe in terms of quantum theory, the purpose of the 
closely related project of quantum cosmology is to describe even the universe as a 
whole as a quantum system. At present, a quantum theory of gravity is mainly sought 
along two avenues (both of which are associated with a number of technical and con-
ceptual problems). The first of these is canonical quantum gravity in which the classi-
cal Einstein equations are somehow quantized.1 The second, and most popular, pro-
gram for quantum gravity is that of string theory. Contrary to canonical quantum 
gravity, string theory aims to unite the description of gravity with those of the other 
forces in nature (electromagnetic, weak, and strong forces), and is in this sense the 
most ambitious attempt of a quantized theory of gravity. Thus, string theory not only 
postulates (like canonical quantum gravity) unification in the sense that all forces are 
quantum in nature but also that all the quantum forces can be derived from one single 
theory. String theory is therefore often referred to as a candidate for a theory of every-
thing.  
                                                     
1 Such a quantization might be carried out e.g. by making the space-time metric a quantum operator. In a 
sense this amounts to a ‘discretization’ of space and time insofar as one can at all speak of space and 
time in quantum gravity (see below). For a good popular introduction to the different approaches to 
quantum gravity, see Smolin (2001). 
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 The quantum gravity project raises a number of philosophical issues, some of 
which I shall deal with below (in this paper the hard technical problems associated 
with quantum gravity will be ignored). In particular, I will critically examine the moti-
vations behind quantum gravity and the question of whether such a theory is, if not 
strictly necessary, then at least desirable. Furthermore I will address the question of 
whether a quantum theory of gravity, if constructed, can fit the bill of being a kind of 
ultimate theory which could in principle account for all physical phenomena.  
 The outline of the paper is as follows. I first (section 2) discuss how the motiva-
tions behind a quantum theory of gravity are related to the ideas of unity and reduc-
tionism in physics. In this connection, I review Bohr’s idea of unity without reduction-
ism, and discuss how the enterprise of quantum gravity is related to the interpretation 
of quantum mechanics. I then (section 3) briefly review an argument for the necessity 
of a quantized theory of gravity, and argue that such a theory is necessary neither for 
consistency reasons nor (at least so far) on experimental grounds. In a broad sense 
quantum gravity may be conceived of as any theory which couples general relativity 
(and thus a classical description of gravity) with quantum theory. I argue that the ex-
pectation —which serves as a motivation for quantum gravity in the broad sense— 
that general relativity and quantum theory must be connected in the high energy re-
gime might be questioned (in particular due to the so-called cosmological constant 
problem). In section 4, I put forward an argument which suggests that the eventual 
construction of a quantum theory of gravity is not likely to be a fundamental theory in 
the sense often advocated (i.e. a theory from which all other theories of, and phenom-
ena in, physics could be derived). I point out that whatever formal relations can be es-
tablished between quantum gravity and the supposedly less fundamental (classical) 
theories, the latter are in any case needed to specify the field of application of the 
former. This raises doubts concerning the sense in which quantum gravity could be the 
fundamental theory.  
2. Reductionism and the Unity of Physics 
The quest for unification is a major drive behind the search for quantum gravity. For 
instance, Kiefer (2004, p. 2) writes in the introduction to his recent book on quantum 
gravity concerning the main motivations for this theory: 
The first motivation is unification. The history of science shows that a reductionist viewpoint has 
been very fruitful in physics (Weinberg 1993). The standard model of particle physics is a quan-
tum field theory that has united in a certain sense all non-gravitational interactions. [...] The uni-
versal coupling of gravity to all forms of energy would make it plausible that gravity has to be 
implemented in a quantum framework too. 
As discussed below, it is not always the case  that unification coincides with reduction-
ism. In any case, it is true that the idea of unification between the different natural 
phenomena, and the theories that describe them, has been a guiding principle in phys-
ics at least since the days of Galileo. Indeed, the “success” history of physics can, at 
least partly, be portrayed as the history of unification. Think for example of Newton’s 
unification of heavenly and terrestrial phenomena by the universality of gravitation; or 
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Ørsted, Faraday, and Maxwell’s unification of electric and magnetic forces embedded 
in Maxwell’s equations. A more modern example is provided by Glashow, Salam and 
Weinberg’s electroweak theory of elementary particles which couples electromagnetic 
and weak forces (the latter being responsible for certain types of radioactivity). In or-
der to see where quantum gravity fits into the unification picture, it is helpful to briefly 
review the relations between some of the central theories of physics. 
 Quantum field theory and general relativity stand as two of the greatest achieve-
ments in 20th century physics.2 Both theories are already unified in the sense that they 
combine various former theories in a common framework. Thus, the special theory of 
relativity is a combination of electromagnetism and the non-gravitational part of clas-
sical mechanics; and general relativity is a generalization of the special theory in which 
gravitation is also included. In a similar manner, quantum field theory is a combina-
tion of special relativity and quantum mechanics. The situation can be schematically 
represented as follows (note that only the physical theories relevant for this paper are 
included): 
 
Electromagnetic Theory            Classical Mechanics 
 
Special theory of Relativity       Quantum Mechanics 
 
General theory of Relativity      Quantum Field Theory 
   ?                  ? 
Quantum Gravity 
  
The arrows in this scheme represent the direction towards deeper or more general lay-
ers in our description of nature (see below). The question marks represent that a the-
ory of quantum gravity and —more generally— the connection between the quantum 
(right-hand) side and general relativity, is still a speculation only.  
 In various ways the scheme is an expression of reductionism. On the one hand, the 
arrows indicate the direction towards something smaller (right hand side). On the 
other hand, the arrows indicate the direction towards something more general (both 
left and right hand side). A theory of quantum gravity (in particular string theory 
                                                     
2 Quantum field theory is here and in the following understood as the common framework for the theory 
of light and electrons as fields (quantum electrodynamics), the theory of weak nuclear forces, and the 
theory of quarks and gluons. The combination of these theories —known as the standard model of 
particle physics— describes the inner structure of atoms via quantum fields.  
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which aims to unify all forces known in nature) combines these trends by describing 
something both smaller and more general than what is found on the higher levels.3  
 In accordance with these reductionist trends the higher levels are often seen as 
merely useful special cases of the deeper levels. Quantitatively, this thought is backed 
by the fact that at least some of the mathematical expressions of the deeper levels are 
identical with those of the higher levels in certain limiting cases.4 When such mathe-
matical identity can be established, reductionism contains the possibility of recon-
structing the higher levels from the deeper ones. Indeed, an important motivation be-
hind the most ambitious quantum gravity program, string theory, is precisely to re-
verse the arrows of the above scheme and derive all known physics from a few basic 
principles of this theory. This idea is in accordance with Einstein’s declaration from 
1918: 
The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal laws from which the cosmos can 
be built up by pure deduction.5  
The Einsteinian ambition is thus not just a reduction to more fundamental theories —
that is, either to dissect objects into smaller and smaller parts or show that theories on 
a higher level are special cases of those of a deeper level (or both in the case of string 
theory). Also, and more explicitly in the quote, the idea is reconstructing the universe 
from scratch. That is, if we have the universal laws described by a fundamental theory, 
and we have identified the fundamental constituents of matter, then we can derive —
at least in principle— all phenomena in the universe (modulo the indeterminism 
stemming from quantum theory), as well as the theories describing these phenomena.6 
A contemporary expression of such an ambitious reductionism/reconstructivism can 
be found in Tegmark and Wheeler (2001). These authors include a much more general 
                                                     
3 A referee points out that one ought to distinguish between theoretical and ontological reductionism 
since the former is much more difficult and limited than the latter. However, this distinction is not 
without problems in the quantum context. For instance, while modern physics asserts that matter is 
made up of atoms, any adequate description of these objects (and the precise sense in which they 
constitute matter) requires quantum theory. Moreover, recent studies (of decoherence) have revealed 
that atoms and molecules can behave as quantum objects in one context, and as classical objects in 
another (see e.g. Arndt et al 1999). 
4 As noted e.g. in Weinstein (2005, p. 5), none of the programs for quantum gravity has as yet succeeded 
in showing that the less fundamental theories (general relativity in the case of canonical quantum 
gravity or general relativity + the standard model of particle physics in the case of string theory) can 
be obtained in some limiting case. 
5 The quote is from a conference entitled ‘Principles of research’ delivered in Berlin in connection with 
the 60th birthday of Max Planck. 
6 It should be noted that Einstein was unsatisfied with quantum theory as a final theory and would there-
fore, presumably, not have agreed with quantum gravity being a candidate for such a unified theory. 
Indeed, Einstein did not engage in quantum gravity debates and instead worked, until his death in 
1955, on a classical unified theory of physics (attempting to combine electromagnetism and gravity), 
see Stachel (1999).  
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scheme than the one above, in which subjects such as chemistry, biology, psychology 
and sociology are all seen as derived from fundamental physics. 
Unity without reductionism? 
Various doubts can be raised against reductionism. Often the debate is focused on the 
notion of emergence —the question of whether new and irreducible phenomena exist 
at the higher levels of description (irreducible in the sense that the emergent phenom-
ena cannot be explained by the deeper level).7 For the subsequent discussion on how 
much can be expected from a theory of quantum gravity, however, it will be more 
useful to briefly review a different anti-reductionistic argument which can be associ-
ated with Bohr’s insistence on the necessity of classical physics in the description of 
quantum phenomena. If correct, this argument demonstrates not only that phenom-
ena of (some of) the higher levels cannot be reduced to (or reconstructed from) the 
deeper ones, but also that the phenomena of the deeper levels cannot be defined, and 
are therefore dependent on, (some of) the higher levels.  
 Bohr contended that we cannot account for (or understand) the quantum phe-
nomena —for instance the motion of an atom, or the interference pattern in the fa-
mous double-slit experiment— unless reference is made to a specific experimental 
context in which the measurement apparatus must be described by the concepts of 
classical physics, see e.g. Bohr (1958, p. 4). The idea of being described by classical 
physics concepts implies that the measurement apparatus —in contrast to quantum 
systems— has well-defined values of both position and momentum, and thus it is not 
subject to any quantum uncertainties or superpositions. According to Bohr a main 
reason for the necessity of this distinction between the quantum objects and the 
measuring instrument is that the interaction between the object and the apparatus is a 
defining feature of the quantum phenomena (Bohr 1958, p. 4).  
 Of course, Bohr’s view is just one of a number of proposed alternative interpreta-
tions of quantum theory. Most of these alternatives follow the line of von Neumann 
and attempt (in a reductionist spirit) to treat the measurement apparatus itself as a 
quantum system. As is well known, however, such approaches run into the notorious 
measurement problem. Stated briefly, the problem is that if everything, including 
measurement apparatuses, is quantum (and thus correctly described by Schrödinger’s 
equation), then we ought to see superpositions in the measurement outcomes, e.g. ap-
paratus pointers being in various positions at the same time —and that clearly contra-
dicts what we in fact do see. Responding to this problem involves invoking assump-
tions —such as many worlds, hidden variables, or modified dynamics— which go be-
yond the quantum formalism itself to somehow ‘explain away’ why no quantum 
                                                     
7 Note that some proponents of emergent phenomena still agree with reductionism but reject reconstruc-
tionism. For instance, Anderson (1972) holds that “The ability to reduce everything to simple funda-
mental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe”. Pre-
cisely how the relation between different levels should then be understood, however, is unclear; see 
e.g. Cat (1998) for a critical discussion of Anderson’s view and for a detailed discussion of the rela-
tionship between unity, emergence, and (different notions of) reductionism in modern physics. 
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strangeness is seen in the measurement results (for an overview of proposed re-
sponses to the measurement problem, and their problems, see e.g. Albert 1992).8
 Bohr actually agreed that the measurement apparatus can also be described by 
quantum theory. However, he writes (1939, p. 104): 
... in each case some ultimate measuring instruments, like the scales and clocks which determine 
the frame of space-time coordination —on which, in the last resort, even the definitions of mo-
mentum and energy quantities rest— must always be described entirely on classical lines, and 
consequently kept outside the system subject to quantum mechanical treatment. 
The point is that we can treat a measuring apparatus (or part of this) as a quantum sys-
tem, but only when some other system is then treated classically. This requirement 
guarantees, in consistency with what we observe, that measurements do indeed have 
definite outcomes.9 Thus Bohr can effectively be taken to argue that any system, at 
least in principle, can be treated quantum mechanically, but that not all systems can be 
treated that way at the same time. This means that to those who hold that all objects 
are quantum in some ontological sense, Bohr might well have responded that although 
the existence of both measurement apparatuses and, say, atoms are beyond doubt —
we cannot say exactly what these objects are like. All which can be inferred is that in 
some circumstances objects can be described as if they were quantum and in other cir-
cumstances as if they were classical.10  
 These brief remarks cannot, of course, constitute a comprehensive analysis of 
Bohr’s view —and much less a satisfactory defence of it. But they indicate one way to 
have unity without reductionism. For if quantum physics (and quantum phenomena) 
cannot be understood without classical physics (and classical phenomena, e.g. objects 
with well-defined values of both position and momentum), it is altogether unclear 
                                                     
8 Note that even if some of these ‘quantum reductionist’ approaches (in which all systems are treated as 
being quantum) are taken as adequate responses to the measurement problem, the general reduction-
ist program in physics is not automatically vindicated. For instance, hidden variable theories like 
Bohm’s and the spontaneous collapse models of Ghiradi, Rimini and Weber have been charged of 
being incompatible with special relativity (see e.g. Barrett 2000 and 2003). 
9 See Howard (1994) for an interesting suggestion of how Bohr’s ideas on this point might be recon-
structed and understood in terms of entanglement between the measurement apparatus and the quan-
tum object under investigation. Howard hints (1994, p. 204) that Bohr’s insistence on classical de-
scriptions can be understood without assuming any “...fundamental ontological or epistemological 
distinction [between the classical and the quantum]”. I do not agree with this claim but I cannot argue 
the point here.  
10 Of course, many scholars have been dissatisfied with Bohr’s ‘dissolution’ of the measurement problem 
(by always having part of the system being described classically). Among the problems with Bohr’s 
account are that there is no clear prescription of how the borderline between the classical and the 
quantum should be made (rather it is context dependent from case to case), see e.g. Bell (2004, 
p.171); and that is does not give an account of (but rather black-boxes) exactly what happens in a 
measurement situation, that is, how precisely the classical apparatus interacts with the quantum ob-
ject, see e.g. Howard (1994, p. 211).  
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what it would mean to reduce the latter to the former.11 And unity is not denied if this 
is taken to mean that entities and phenomena of two theories are interconnected but 
not reducible to each other. Indeed, Bohr emphasized both that, on the one hand, 
classical physics is necessary to define quantum phenomena, and, on the other hand, 
quantal laws are needed to explain the stability of classical objects (see e.g. Bohr 1958, 
p. 2).  
 This brief discussion illustrates that a motivation for quantum gravity based on an 
appeal to reductionism in physics can be resisted —even while the quest for unity is 
maintained. More importantly, as we shall see in section 4, there is a sense in which 
Bohr’s insistence on the necessity of classical physics for understanding quantum 
physics might be vindicated in connection with specifying the field of application for a 
quantum theory of gravity.  
3. Is a theory of quantum gravity necessary? 
Considerations of whether or not reductionism has been a successful doctrine in phys-
ics would, of course, be largely irrelevant for motivating the project of quantum grav-
ity if such a theory were in any case needed on experimental or logical grounds. With 
respect to the latter, Bryce DeWitt argued in the early 1960s that just as the electro-
magnetic field must be quantized to be consistent with quantum mechanics, the gravi-
tational field should be quantized for the same consistency reason. DeWitt’s argument 
(1962), which has since been repeated by other physicists, rests on two premises; 1) 
the existence of logical arguments for the quantization of the electromagnetic field; 
and 2) that the electromagnetic case is sufficiently analogous to the gravitational case. 
According to DeWitt and others, the first premise is supposed to follow from a fa-
mous analysis from 1933 in which Bohr and Rosenfeld discussed the measurability of 
the quantized electromagnetic field. In particular, the Bohr-Rosenfeld analysis is 
claimed to show that the uncertainty relations for a charged particle interacting with 
an electromagnetic field necessitates that the electromagnetic field is also quantized.  
 Rosenfeld himself, however, saw matters differently. Although he had been the 
first to try to construct a theory of quantum gravity (in 1930), he later expressed hesi-
tations towards the project —in particular because there was no experimental evi-
dence for any quantum effects of gravity (this is still true, see below). With respect to 
DeWitt’s argument, Rosenfeld (1963) pointed out that the Bohr-Rosenfeld analysis 
                                                     
11 Note that this is not in conflict with the formalistic fact that quantum expressions may correspond to 
classical expressions in certain limiting cases. One way in which classical mechanics may be said to be 
a limiting case of quantum mechanics is via the so-called Ehrenfest’s theorem which is the quantum 
mechanical equivalent of Newton’s second law. However, since this theorem involves mean (or ex-
pectation) values of quantum operators, and since such expectation values are bound up with the 
quantum mechanical measurement process, there is —in spite of formal identity of Ehrenfest’s theo-
rem and Newton’s second law in certain limits— no question of deriving classical behaviour from the 
quantum formalism, see e.g. Joos et al (2003, p. 87). For examples of how, on a Bohrian understand-
ing, quantum mechanics coincide with (but do not reduce) classical physics in certain limits, e.g. via 
the correspondence principle, see Falkenburg (1998). 
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showed the consistency of the electromagnetic field quantization (i.e. that it is possible 
to treat the electromagnetic field with quantum principles), not its necessity. Further-
more, Rosenfeld argued that the analogy between the gravitational and the electro-
magnetic field (DeWitt’s second premise) is problematic due to the appearance of a 
definite scale for space and time intervals in the quantum theory of gravity. Such 
length and time scales, referred to as Planck scales, result from the combination of 
Newton’s gravitational constant G, Planck’s constant h , and the speed of light c – the 
Planck length is 3351 10−≈,/cGh  cm, and the Planck time is 435 10−≈cG /h seconds.  
Rosenfeld notes that such small length and time scales may not be well-defined since 
considerations of an analogous case from quantum electrodynamics in which scales 
are involved (when the charge and current distributions are quantized) suggest an ab-
solute limit to space-time localization given by the proton radius, cm, which is 20 
orders of magnitude larger than the Planck length scale (see also Rosenfeld 1966, p. 
605). Finally, Rosenfeld stressed that the eventual construction of a quantum theory of 
gravity could not essentially change the fundamental role of classical theory for the 
understanding of quantum theory. Commenting on the early Bohr-Rosenfeld analysis, 
he wrote (Rosenfeld 1963, p. 443): 
1310−
The ultimate necessity of quantizing the electromagnetic field (or any other field) can only be 
founded on experience, and all that considerations of measurability of field components can do is 
to illustrate the consistency of the way in which the mathematical formalism of a theory embody-
ing such quantization is linked with the classical concepts on which its use in analysing the phe-
nomena rests.  
Thus, Rosenfeld most likely agreed with Bohr’s vision of the unity of physics implying 
that quantum gravity could not possibly be a final theory from which classical physics 
(and classical phenomena) can be derived.  
 Recent studies have shown that the situation concerning the necessity of quantiz-
ing the gravitational field has remained essentially unchanged since Rosenfeld’s re-
marks. Thus, Callender and Huggett (2001) and Wüthrich (2004), reviewing and 
evaluating arguments concerning the necessity of quantization, both argue that there 
are no convincing reasons to affirm that gravity must be quantized. However, all of 
these authors agree that a theory of quantum gravity —understood in the broad sense 
as any theory which couples general relativity and quantum theory— is nevertheless 
desirable, and that there are situations in which such a theory is needed. We turn to 
their arguments below after a quick look at the empirical situation. 
Quantum gravity vs. observations and experiments 
No observations or experiments have so far observed any quantum effects of gravity. 
This is, however, not surprising since quantum effects of gravity are expected to show 
up primarily at the above mentioned Planck scales. The most likely observational signa-
                                                     
13 Other effects are being contemplated within the field known as quantum gravity phenomenology. For 
instance, it has been suggested that quantum gravity effects could be responsible for certain puzzling 
observations of cosmic rays. The situation, however, is still far from settled; see e.g. Amelino-Camelia 
(2003). 
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tures of quantum gravity are to be found in the very early (small time scale) universe, 
or the extreme conditions (high energy scale) associated with black holes (see below) 
—and none of these regions are easy to access observationally.13 Another option for 
probing quantum gravity effects is to try to access the Planck scales via experimental 
studies of phenomena at very small length scales. Such experimental studies, however, 
seem remote. For instance, Baez (2001) notes: 
To study a situation where both general relativity and quantum field theory are important, we 
could try to compress a cell to a size 10-20 times that of a proton. We know no reason why this is 
impossible in principle, but we have no idea how to actually accomplish such a feat. 
Nevertheless, as another motivation for quantum gravity it is sometimes mentioned 
(e.g. Callender and Huggett 2001, p. 5) that although no effects of quantum gravity has 
been seen, experiments have established that classical gravity is indeed related to (non-
relativistic) quantum theory. One such experiment used a so-called neutron interfer-
ometer to demonstrate that the gravitational field affects the behaviour of quantum 
systems such as a beam of neutrons (see e.g. Greenberger and Overhauser 1980). The 
fact remains, however, that there is a big step from the relation between classical grav-
ity and quantum mechanics to quantum effects of gravity itself. For instance, there are 
no experimental signatures of a relation between quantum field theory (like quantum 
electrodynamics) and gravity.14 On the one hand, the absence of such experimental 
signatures is not surprising since quantum field theory deals almost exclusively with 
microscopic systems (in contrast to e.g. the neutron interferometer which allows for a 
test of quantum mechanics at the macroscopic level) and since the gravitational force 
is very small in the microphysical domain. On the other hand, this situation empha-
sizes how difficult it is to establish whether there are any quantum effects of gravity 
(as a quantized field) or even any observational effects of a coupling between general 
relativity (gravity as a classical field) and quantum field theory. 
Alternative relationships between general relativity and quantum theory? 
Given that quantization of the gravitational field is not required on consistency or 
empirical grounds, it is natural to ask how the relationship between general relativity 
and quantum theory could be conceived in case the gravitational field is not quantized. 
For instance, Butterfield and Isham have remarked (Butterfield and Isham 2001, p. 
57):  
If it is indeed wrong to quantise the gravitational field […] it becomes an urgent question how 
matter —which presumably is subject to the laws of quantum theory— should be incorporated in 
the overall scheme.  
As we shall see, the urgency of this question depends on how relevant (experimentally 
and observationally) such an ‘overall scheme’ is —and, of course, whether there is 
one! 
                                                     
14 The so-called Unruh-Davies effect and the Hawking radiation from black holes are theoretical phe-
nomena which are predicted from a relation between quantum field theory and gravity, but so far 
they have not received empirical support. 
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 In his 1963 paper Rosenfeld argued that since there is no experimental need for 
quantizing gravity, it is better to stick with the so-called semi-classical gravity, which 
combines a classical description of the gravitational field with a quantum treatment of 
all other force fields and matter. Technically, the left hand side of the classical Einstein 
equation, describing the curvature of space-time, is equated with the quantum expec-
tation value of the so-called energy-momentum tensor which is a measure of the en-
ergy associated with (quantum) matter and radiation: 
 
                                          µνµνµν
π T
c
GRgR 4
8
2
1 =−                                           (1)                                  
 
where  and  refer to the curvature of space-time,  is the metric, and  the 
energy-momentum tensor. However, this equation is problematic —not least because 
the quantum expectation value on the right hand side is calculated in a fixed space-time 
background, whereas the left hand side describes a dynamical space-time (this leads to 
difficult non-linearity and back-reaction problems; see e.g. Callender and Huggett 
(2001) and Rugh and Zinkernagel (2002)). Such problems are sometimes used to argue 
that the semi-classical approach, at least in its simplest form given by equation (1), is 
not likely to be the fundamental theory describing the interaction between general 
relativity and quantum field theory; see e.g. Kiefer (2004, p. 14 ff.).  
µνR R µνg µνT
 But if there is no strict need to quantize gravity, and if semi-classical gravity is a 
problematic answer to the question of the relationship between general relativity and 
quantum theory, could one then not choose to forget about the whole business of 
quantum gravity? Callender and Huggett (2001, p. 4) comments on this possibility:  
Another philosophical position, which we might dub the ‘disunified physics’ view might in this 
context claim that general relativity describes certain aspects of the world, quantum mechanics 
other distinct aspects, and that would be that. According to this view, physics (and indeed, sci-
ence) need not offer a single universal theory encompassing all physical phenomena. We shall not 
debate the correctness of this view here but we would like to point out that if physics aspires to 
provide a complete account of the world, as it traditionally has, then there must be a quantum 
theory of gravity [in the general sense of a connection between general relativity and quantum 
theory]. The simple reason is that general relativity and quantum mechanics cannot both be cor-
rect even in their domains of applicability.  
As a first argument for this conclusion Callender and Huggett mention that the two 
theories “...cannot both be universal in scope, for the latter strictly predicts that all 
matter is quantum, and the former only describes the gravitational effects of classical 
matter...”. Now, for all the impressive empirical successes of quantum theory, it does 
not predict that all matter is quantum. This conclusion only follows by adopting an 
ontological interpretation of quantum theory according to which, indeed, everything 
ultimately is quantum. I have already mentioned that, on Bohr’s view, this move can 
be resisted insofar as objects are not either quantum or classical (even if, say, macro-
scopic systems are more prone to a classical description than are microscopic sys-
tems). 
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 Whatever the plausibility of Bohr’s position, however, Callender and Huggett offer 
a further argument for their conclusion that general relativity and quantum theory 
must somehow interact (this is a common argument, contained also in the quote by 
Kiefer in section 2): The Einstein field equation couples the gravitational field, and 
thus the space-time structure, to all matter and energy. And,  
[q]uantum fields carry energy and mass; therefore, if general relativity is true, quantum fields dis-
tort the curvature of spacetime and the curvature of spacetime affects the motion of the quantum 
fields. If these theories are to yield a complete account of physical phenomena, there will be no 
way to avoid those situations —involving very high energies— in which there are non-negligible 
interactions between the quantum and gravitational fields... 
As I will discuss further below, the situations where such interactions become relevant 
are mostly associated with the very early universe or with speculative features of black 
holes. Now, it could be objected that these situations are not relevant (at least yet), 
since there are still no experimental or observational evidence which make them so. 
This could for instance be argued within the framework of Cartwright’s ‘Dappled 
World’ —which might well be the implicit target for Callender and Huggett’s reluc-
tance towards ‘disunified physics’. Cartwright argues (1999, p. 24 ff.) that we have no 
reasons to believe our theories outside the domain where the successes of these theo-
ries have been established or, at least, not outside the domain where an adequate 
model of the phenomena in question can be formulated —and in this sense physical 
theories should not be expected to give a complete account of physical phenomena. 
For instance, Cartwright holds that a 1000 dollar bill swept away by the wind cannot 
be taken to follow Newton’s second law since no good-fitting molecular (or other-
wise) model of the wind is available. In the absence of such a model, on Cartwright’s 
view, the belief that the wind operates on the bank note via forces is “...another ex-
pression of fundamentalist faith” (1999, p. 28). However, as Hoefer (2003, p. 1408) 
reasonably complains, Cartwright’s rejection to make inductive inferences from our 
successful theories to not easily modelled cases comes dangerously close to reject 
making any inductions at all!  
 Nevertheless, without committing myself to Cartwright’s general thesis, I do think 
a bit of scepticism about the scope of our inductions is in order in the present case. 
For there are reasons to suspect that our intuitions about the relationship between 
general relativity and quantum (field) theory are insufficient to allow extrapolations 
(inductions) into the very high energy regime. I am here thinking in particular of the 
so-called cosmological constant problem which might threaten the very idea of a for-
mal connection (like equation 1, or any other type of coupling) between quantum field 
theory and general relativity. In essence the problem is that whereas quantum field 
theory predicts an astronomically high value for µνT  —implying an extreme curvature 
of space-time— it is observationally known that space-time is flat or almost flat.15 The 
                                                     
15 More precisely, when the expectation value of  is evaluated in the vacuum state, it takes the same 
form as the cosmological constant in general relativity (this constant has, for simplicity, not been in-
cluded in equation 1).  
µνT
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cosmological constant problem, which is so far unsolved, is conceived to be a ‘verita-
ble crisis’ for fundamental physics, see Weinberg (1989). As discussed in Rugh and 
Zinkernagel (2002), the problem rests fundamentally on two assumptions —both of 
which can be questioned: (i) The quantum field theoretic vacuum energy is physically 
real (as in the standard interpretation of quantum field theory); and (ii) the validity of 
some semi-classical approach in which quantum (vacuum) energy acts as a source in 
Einstein’s field equation. This last assumption implies a formal coupling between gen-
eral relativity and quantum field theory, and the cosmological constant problem could 
therefore be argued to constitute a threat to the idea of a connection between these 
two theories.16  
 Thus, the apparently straightforward assumption made by Callender and Huggett 
that general relativity couples to all forms of (quantum) energy might be questioned. 
In any case, the cosmological constant problem suggests that our understanding of the 
connection between general relativity and quantum field theory is (still) too premature 
to trust extrapolations into the high energy regime. I emphasize that this does not 
constitute an argument to the effect that general relativity and quantum field theory 
are not connected. It is rather that, given the present unclear situation surrounding the 
cosmological constant problem, all cards should be left on the table.  
 So much by way of sketching how some of the motivations behind the search for a 
quantum theory of gravity —either as a theory of quantized gravity or in the broad 
sense of a theory which couples general relativity and quantum theory— could per-
haps be resisted. In the following section, I will disregard possible scepticism as con-
cerns the motivations for quantum gravity, and instead ask how much would be 
accomplished if such a theory is eventually constructed. 
4. Could quantum gravity be the fundamental theory? 
Although a quantum theory of gravity in which gravity is quantized has still not been 
found, the eventual construction of such a theory is often associated with at least two 
conjectures: 
1. Quantum gravity will imply that our usual classical notions of space and time 
are only approximate valid concepts (valid at our length and time scales), 
which somehow emerge from the ‘real’ quantum nature of space and time; see 
e.g. Butterfield and Isham (1999). 
2. More generally, quantum gravity will provide the ultimate explanation of clas-
sical physics from a deeper quantum physics level (for instance from string 
theory); see e.g. Weinberg (1993) and Tegmark and Wheeler (2001).  
                                                     
16 It should be mentioned that the cosmological constant problem has also been read as an argument for 
the necessity of quantum gravity —and solutions to the problem have been proposed within this 
framework (and the related idea of quantum cosmology), see also Zinkernagel (2002). Apart from the 
fact that no general framework for quantum gravity exists as yet, however, these solutions seem to be 
problematic, see Weinberg (1989, p. 20ff.) for discussion and references.  
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I have already indicated that the second of these (reductionist) conjectures is in con-
flict with Bohr’s thesis that classical physics is necessary to account for the quantum 
phenomena, and, as I shall briefly hint below, the first conjecture is also problematic 
from a Bohrian perspective. Not surprisingly, therefore, many physicists working on 
quantum gravity (and quantum cosmology) often appeal to some version of the 
Everettian many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics; see e.g. Butterfield and 
Isham (1999, p. 144). Disregarding the other alternative interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, it may therefore seem as if one is faced with a choice between Bohr’s ‘one 
world-two theories’, or Everett’s ‘one theory-many worlds’. While I cannot, of course, 
attempt to seriously adjudicate between these interpretations here, I will suggest that 
Bohr’s idea of the necessity of classical physics cannot be as easily dismissed in discus-
sions of quantum gravity as is sometimes suggested.17 This suggestion can be devel-
oped by asking how the theory of quantum gravity is supposed to work without clas-
sical physics.  
 As we have seen above, it is usually assumed that the effects of quantum gravity 
should become relevant at very small (Planck) time- and length-scales, respectively 
~10–43 sec and ~10–33 cm. There are two types of situations, both involving very high 
energies, where these effects should manifest themselves. The first is the very early 
universe where the extreme conditions near the Big Bang are expected to make Planck 
scale physics necessary (the high energies near the Big Bang results because the time 
parameter in this cosmological model is inversely proportional to the square of the 
temperature —and hence to energy). The second situation is connected to black holes. 
These exotic objects, which are supposedly common in the universe, are expected to 
gradually lose energy (Hawking radiation). Due to curious effects of so-called black 
hole thermodynamics, the final stages of a black hole is supposed to be characterized 
by energy loss in the form of radiation in which each photon has an energy close to 
the Planck energy. Consequently, it is expected that this final stage can only be under-
stood by a full quantum theory of gravity (in which gravity is quantized); see e.g. 
Smolin (2001, p. 92). Moreover, quantum gravity is also expected to describe the black 
hole singularity at —or very near— the center of a black hole.  
 It is sometimes said that since general relativity predicts space-time singularities 
(the Big Bang and the center of black holes), this theory predicts its own demise as it 
is unable to describe the vicinity of these singularities (due to quantum gravity effects). 
As discussed below, however, theoretical (and observational) access to either the very 
early universe or black holes relies firmly on classical theory —namely classical general 
relativity. This seems to imply that one must presuppose classical theories in order to de-
fine the field of application for quantum gravity. If this is correct then it at least limits 
the sense in which general relativity can be reduced to quantum gravity. On the other 
hand, the formalism of general relativity is expected to be derivable from an eventual 
theory of quantum gravity in some limiting case. This situation is somewhat analogous 
                                                     
17 An example of a dismissive evaluation of Bohr’s position in connection with quantum gravity can be 
found in Butterfield and Isham (1999, p. 143). 
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to Bohr’s view on the role of classical mechanics in quantum mechanics. For instance, 
Landau and Lifshitz —quoting Bohr approvingly— wrote in the introduction to their 
book on quantum mechanics (1981, p. 3): 
Thus quantum mechanics occupies a very unusual place among physical theories: it contains clas-
sical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the same time it requires this limiting case for its own 
formulation.  
A way to understand this claim is, as we have seen, that formal identities between 
quantum and classical expressions notwithstanding, the measurement problem implies 
that quantum theory by itself cannot account for any classical phenomena —such as 
definite measurement outcomes with well-defined space-time and energy-momentum 
properties. I should note that the above mentioned necessity of general relativity for 
quantum gravity is only somewhat analogous to the necessity of classical mechanics 
for quantum mechanics —for the role of the classical theory in the former case is not 
to account for observed phenomena but rather to specify the field of application of 
the quantum theory. Nevertheless, in the case of quantum gravity, it is much less ob-
vious that one can circumvent the need for a classical theory by opting for a different 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
The problems of time 
In order to spell out more clearly the way in which classical physics is presupposed in 
defining the field of application of quantum gravity, I shall briefly consider the role of 
the concept of time in the very early universe. Although quantum gravity is supposed 
to fundamentally change our usual notion of time, it is notoriously difficult to see how 
the notion of time employed in the less fundamental theories could somehow emerge 
from quantum gravity. For instance, the central equation in canonical quantum grav-
ity, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, does not depend on time at all, and this obviously 
makes it hard to see how the equation can be relevant for theoretical descriptions of 
the very early (but evolving) universe. This much discussed ‘problem of time’ in quan-
tum gravity is a consequence of the very different role that time plays in quantum the-
ory (where it is a fixed background parameter) and general relativity (where time is dy-
namical and depends on the matter-energy distribution).18 But apart from the problem 
of how time could emerge from timeless quantum gravity (which is closely related to 
the ‘problem of time’, see e.g. Butterfield and Isham 1999), it is also hard to make 
sense of the “reverse” transition from time in the early universe to timeless quantum gravity.  
 This problem, which could be called the reverse problem of time, arises as follows: 
As mentioned above, it is conjectured that quantum gravity (and quantum cosmology) 
will be particularly relevant for discussing the conditions in the very early universe 
where quantum effects of gravity are expected to be important. But any discussion of 
                                                     
18 Kiefer (2004, p. 4) mentions the problem of time as the third main motivation behind the search of a 
quantum theory of gravity. However, this motivation only makes sense when it is already assumed 
that general relativity and quantum theory must be brought together in a unified framework (Kiefer’s 
first motivation) or, at least, that there are situations where both of these theories are relevant 
(Kiefer’s second motivation).  
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the ‘early’ universe obviously requires that we have a cosmic time concept which indi-
cates that we are close (temporally) to the Big Bang singularity. Indeed, a cosmic time 
concept is one of the fundamental ingredients in the Big Bang model of the uni-
verse.19 The cosmic time parameter is the proper time of a standard clock (for in-
stance, an imagined perfect wrist watch) at rest in the so-called co-moving frame, and 
it is this time concept physicists and cosmologists have in mind when discussing con-
ditions in the early universe. Indeed, the Planck scale is reached in cosmology by ex-
trapolating backwards the Big Bang model in this cosmic time. Thus, the assumption 
that quantum gravity (or quantum cosmology) is relevant for the study of the very 
early universe rests on a solid classical (i.e. not described by a quantum operator) no-
tion of time. But if it is conjectured that timeless quantum gravity is the fundamental 
theory —from which classical physics and concepts can be derived— it appears para-
doxical that its central field of application (the early universe) is only defined by a con-
cept (classical cosmic time) which is completely alien to the theory.  
 The above argument may be seen as a particular instance of Bohr’s (and 
Rosenfeld’s) point that classical physics and classical concepts are necessary in order 
to define and analyze the quantum phenomena. Thus, whether or not one agrees with 
Bohr that we need classical physics to relate the quantum formalism with measure-
ments, the very definition of the central field of application for quantum gravity rests 
on classical concepts.20 As already hinted, it is difficult to circumvent this argument by 
referring to other interpretations of quantum theory, as also such other interpretations 
will have to rely on a classical notion of time in order to discuss the early universe. In 
turn, if we cannot even discuss the central application of quantum gravity without as-
suming a classical time concept, it is not clear what we should understand by an as-
sumption like ‘the ultimate nature of space-time is non-classical’ and, more generally, 
what we should understand by the assumption that ‘classical physics can ultimately be 
explained from the deeper level of quantum gravity’.  
 It should finally be noted that not all researchers in quantum gravity subscribe to 
the reductionist conjectures associated with the theory (related to an ‘all is quantum’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics). Thus, Rovelli mentions in the conclusion of his 
recent book on quantum gravity (2004, p. 370): 
                                                     
19 In general, there is no global time parameter in classical general relativity, but such a parameter is part 
of the particular Big Bang solution to Einstein’s field equations which is assumed to be a reasonable 
approximate description of our universe. 
20 A similar point may be argued for the case of quantum gravity effects related to black holes. I leave it 
out here however, since such effects in a sense are even more remote than those related to the very 
early universe: There is good empirical evidence of a universal expansion and thus of a smaller and 
denser state of the universe in the past. To reach the very early universe we therefore ‘only’ need to 
extrapolate backwards an empirical successful model (see however hesitations to this extrapolations 
in Rugh and Zinkernagel 2006). By contrast, since Hawking radiation from black holes has not yet 
been observed, and since nothing is known about the interior of black holes, it would seem that more 
than extrapolations of successful models are involved in contemplating quantum gravity effects in 
connection with black holes.  
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I see no reason why a quantum theory of gravity should not be sought within a standard interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics (whatever one prefers). [...] We can consistently use the Copenha-
gen interpretation to describe the interaction between a macroscopic classical apparatus and a 
quantum gravitational phenomenon happening, say, in a small region of (macroscopic) spacetime. 
The fact that the notion of spacetime breaks down at short scale within this region does not pre-
vent us from having the region interacting with an external Copenhagen observer. 
Now, on Bohr’s version of the Copenhagen interpretation, the important point is not 
the observer but rather that the measurement apparatus is to be described on classical 
lines. In any case, and in the light of the above discussion, I think the quote expresses 
a highly recommendable attitude —namely that the search for quantum gravity should 
not a priori exclude specific interpretations of quantum mechanics. In fact, Rovelli’s 
idea that space-time breaks down within a small macroscopic space-time region might 
support the idea that classical space-time concepts (e.g. the macroscopic region sur-
rounding the ‘breakdown region’) are needed to formulate the ‘domain of application’ 
of quantum gravity —and can in this way hardly be seen to be derivable from this 
theory.21  
I do not claim, however, that Rovelli would endorse this conclusion. For one 
thing, the close connection between quantum gravity and quantum cosmology (in 
which even the universe as a whole is described in quantum terms), and in particular 
the fact that quantum gravity (also on Rovelli’s view) is held to be relevant for the very 
early universe, would seem to make it difficult to accommodate either classical appara-
tus or classical concepts (such as a macroscopic region of space-time) at the very early 
stages of the universe. In any case, I think Rovelli would have to accept that these 
early stages can only be addressed (and observationally accessed) via the classical time 
concept of standard cosmology. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
A quantum theory of gravity is presently considered the holy grail of theoretical phys-
ics. In this manuscript I have tried to argue that the motivations behind the quest for 
this theory may be resisted, and that — in any case— there are good reasons to doubt 
that it can be the ‘theory of everything’. More specifically: 
 By reviewing Bohr’s conception of quantum mechanics, I have first illustrated one 
way to question reductionism in physics. Since reductionism serves as a motivation for 
quantum gravity, this shows a sense in which quantum gravity depends on interpreta-
tive issues in quantum theory. Secondly, I pointed out that there is no compelling ar-
gument to the effect that quantum gravity is necessary —neither logically nor (at least, 
                                                     
21 Perhaps this could be taken to mean that on a Bohrian understanding of quantum theory, the quantiza-
tion of the gravitational field, and therefore of space-time, can be done only ‘locally’ (within a classi-
cally described space-time volume). This would be in accordance with the quote by Bohr in section 2 
according to which an ultimate measurement apparatus which determine a spatio-temporal frame-
work for the quantum phenomena must be described by classical physics concepts (in particular, this 
would fit with a relationist account of space-time which links classical space-time to classically de-
scribed rods and clocks, see e.g. Teller (1999) and Rugh and Zinkernagel (2006b)). 
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as yet) empirically. Furthermore, as discussed in section 3, even the more modest ‘uni-
fied physics’ expectation that general relativity and quantum theory must somehow 
come together at high energy could be resisted. Both because of the lack of empirical 
evidence of any interplay between general relativity and quantum theory and —in par-
ticular— due to our limited understanding of the form of such interplay (even at low 
energy) evidenced by the cosmological constant problem. Finally, I have argued that 
even if a theory of quantum gravity —in a form in which gravity is quantized— could 
be constructed, there are good reasons to believe that this would not remove the in 
principle necessity of classical physics, at least for specifying the field of application of 
quantum gravity. Obviously, it is hard to make predictions concerning what a quan-
tum theory of gravity will eventually look like. But at least there are reasons to believe 
that quantum gravity will not supersede present physics in the sense that all other 
physical theories and phenomena can (even in principle) be derived from, for instance, 
some future form of string theory. 
 None of this, of course, should be taken to imply a recommendation that the quest 
for a quantum theory of gravity ought not to be pursued. All I suggest is that the mo-
tivations behind this quest can be resisted, and that a bit of scepticism concerning 
what could actually be achieved with such a theory seems appropriate. 
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